There has been a lot of joking and innuendo about Diebold voting machines and certainly many critics have imagined that the ways that an election could be stolen by hacking the voting machines. I have always thought that electronic voting, although holding a great amount of potential, is absolutely worthless without some kind of paper receipt for voters, no to mention a paper trail for recounts.
Paper trail issues aside, the Open Voting Foundation has actually put their hands on one of these little technomonsters and have pulled it apart only to come to some interesting and scary conclusions:
“Diebold has made the testing and certification process practically irrelevant,” according to Dechert. “If you have access to these machines and you want to rig an election, anything is possible with the Diebold TS — and it could be done without leaving a trace. All you need is a screwdriver.” This model does not produce a voter verified paper trail so there is no way to check if the voter’s choices are accurately reflected in the tabulation.
Lets say you are a voting area with a heavy dominance of one party or another. Want to mess with the totals? Flip the switch. That’s all you need.
Why isn’t the need for a paper trail obvious?